This paper examines the interaction among the three forces that shape world politics in the contemporary system: globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. The main thesis suggested here is that these three forces cannot be assessed in isolation, independently from one another, nor from a perspective of either convergence or divergence among them. Rather, globalization, regionalization, and nationalism should be captured and studied as forces relative to and overlapping one another, sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperative toward each other but never harmonious. This argument is theoretically relevant both in the context of the world political economy and international security, with special reference to the phenomenon of pluralistic security communities. The Latin American case provides an empirical laboratory to test these theoretical assertions.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the interaction among the three forces that shape world politics in the contemporary system: globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. The main thesis suggested here is that these three forces cannot be assessed in isolation, independently from one another, nor from a perspective of either convergence or divergence among them. Rather, globalization, regionalization, and nationalism should be captured and studied as forces relative to and overlapping one another, sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperative toward each other, but never harmonious. This argument is theoretically relevant both in the context of the world political economy and of international security (with special reference to security complexes and pluralistic security communities). In this sense I want to encourage our thinking about the phenomena of pluralistic security communities and to do so by showing how the interaction of these three forces might make them possible. The
Latin American case will provide an empirical illustration to those theoretical assertions.
The paper is structured in four sections. First, I briefly define the rather confusing and misleading concepts of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. Second, I assess the possible linkages (convergent, divergent, and overlapping) among them. Third, I examine how the emergence of pluralistic security communities epitomizes the complex relationships among these three forces. Finally, I illustrate some of the theoretical arguments with reference to the Latin American region.
The implication of the argument presented above is a plea for pluralism and a picture of indeterminacy regarding the mutual and multiple effects of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. For instance, instead of referring to a single world order, we are witnessing today the emergence of a variety of new regional orders (Lake and Morgan 1997; Holm and Sorensen 1995) . Similarly, we should also qualify the 'global' characterization of globalization: instead of a single one mechanism affecting the entire world, we might also have to specify several or different dimensions, affecting unevenly different regions. Hence, those three forces maintain complex and overlapping relationships with one another. Moreover, they are significant only in relative terms (in relation to one another) and dependent dialectically upon each other.
DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS: GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION, AND NATIONALISM

Globalization
What is globalization? There is a lot of confusion about the term, and about the rhetoric of the 'new world order' following the end of the Cold War. Hence, globalization can be conceived as a myth, a rhetorical device, a phenomenon, an ideology, a reality, an orthodoxy, a rationality.
In both academic and popular discourses globalization has become one of the catchwords of the 1990s. In fact, globalization is a short form for a cluster of related changes: economic, ideological, technological, and cultural. Economic changes include the internationalization of production, the greatly increased mobility of capital and of transnational corporations, and the deepening and intensification of economic interdependence. The economic manifestations of globalization include the spatial reorganization of production, the interpenetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets, the diffusion of identical consumer goods across distant countries, and massive transfers of population (Mittelman 1996b, 2) . Ideological changes include investment and trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and the adoption of political democracy in the institutional realm. Technological changes include information and communi-cations technologies that have shrunk the globe and the shift from goods to services. Finally, cultural changes involve trends toward harmonization of tastes and standards, a universal world culture that transcends the nation-state (Li 1997, 5 ).
According to Holm and Sorensen (1995, 1-7) , globalization can be defined as the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders. In this sense it involves more than the geographical extension of a range of phenomena and issues. It implies not only a significant intensification of global connectedeness but also a consciousness of that intensification, with a concomitant diminution in the significance of territorial boundaries (Bretherton 1996, 3) . Globalization is pushed by several factors, the most important among which is technological change. The process is uneven in both intensity and geographical scope, in its domestic and international dimensions. Hence,
we might obtain different types of globalization across a rich regional variation.
It is important to draw a distinction between the qualitative and the quantitative dimensions of globalization: more of the same (quantitative change) or qualitative shifts (quantum leaps). For instance, true economic globalization invokes a qualitative shift toward a global economic system that is no longer based upon autonomous national economies but relocates production, distribution, and consumption of goods in a consolidated global market-place.
To sum up, the concept of globalization is frequently employed but seldom clearly defined. It means many different things for different people. Among the possible definitions we might include: 1) intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders;
2) the historical period (or historical epoch) launched since the end of the Cold War;
3) the transformation of the world economy epitomized by the anarchy (literally defined) of the financial markets; 4) the triumph of the US values, through the combined agenda of neoliberalism in economics and political democracy; 5) an ideology and an orthodoxy about the logical and inevitable culmination of the powerful tendencies of the market at work; 6) a technological revolution, with social implications; 7) the inability of nation-states to cope with global problems that require global solutions, such as demography, ecology, human rights, and nuclear proliferation (see Cox 1996, 23; Reich and Higgott 1998) .
The economic side of globalization, which receives most of the scholarly attention to the subject, is found in "that loose combination of free-trade agreements, the Internet, and the integration of financial markets that is erasing borders and uniting the world into a single, lucrative, but brutally competitive, marketplace" (Friedman 1996) . It is a small world after all, and that global world is a MacWorld with MTV, CNN, PCs and Macintoshes. Beyond this economic dimension, we might study globalization in the political sense and in the sociological sense as a qualitative shift in the conditions of people's lives.
Neoliberals believe that globalization has been the inevitable result of technological change; moreover, that global economic liberalization will strengthen and lead to political democracy. Globalization will open up societies to democratic tendencies, while economic liberalization will provide the material bases for subsequent democratic consolidation (Li 1997, 2) . Even if this assertion is true, it conceals a conceptual and normative trap: paradoxically, the economic forces of globalization in themselves are undemocratic if not antidemocratic. The lack of accountability of global forces poses a serious political problem. By condensing the time and space of social relations, economic globalization transcends territorial states and is not accountable to elected political officials (Mittelman 1996a, 197) . The only form of accountability is given to unelected market forces, regulated by the logic of economics, which resonates with the Darwinist tendency of the 'survival of the fittest.'
Regions, Security Complexes, and Regionalization
An international region can be broadly defined as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Accordingly, for each state in the region, the activities of other members of the region (be they cooperative or antagonistic) are significant determinants of its foreign policy (Nye 1968, vii; Cantori and Spiegel 1970, 1) . Regional subsystems are characterized by clusters of states coexisting in geographical propinquity as interrelated units that sustain significant security, economic, and political relations (see Wriggins 1992, 4; Kaiser 1968, 86; Buzan 1991, 188) . Regions can be thus conceived as an 'intermediate form of community,' between the national community of the state and the potential global community of humankind (Whiting 1993, 20) , as is clearly evident in the cases of pluralistic security communities.
One of the difficulties in dealing with any region is the problem of delineating its exact spatial borders. Although many regions are denoted by obvious geographic or cultural boundaries, there is always some arbitrariness in their definition. The major criteria remain geographical contiguity, interaction, and a subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive community and having a collective regional identity (see Russett 1967, 7; Haas 1970, 101) . In addition several common characteristics can be suggested, such as: (1) a certain amount or degree of social and cultural homogeneity; (2) similar political attitudes or external behavior toward third parties; (3) common political institutions, as an expression of political interdependence; (4) a certain degree of economic interdependence; and (5) common behavioral criteria, such as the identification of norms pertaining to conflict management and resolution.
Barry Buzan (1991) defines a regional security complex as a specific type of region united by common security problems. In other words, it is a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a given geographic area (Lake 1997, 12) .
Different types of regional security complexes might include: power restraining power (through regional hegemons); great power concert; collective security; pluralistic security communities; and integration, in an ascending order of institutionalization and shared norms (see Morgan 1997, 32-41) .
Regionalization can be conceived as the growth of societal integration within a given region, including the undirected processes of social and economic interaction among the units (such as nation-states; see Hurrell 1995a, 39) . As a dynamic process, it can be best understood as a continuing process of forming regions as geopolitical units, as organized political cooperation within a particular group of states, and/or as regional communities such as pluralistic security communities (see Whiting 1993, 19) .
Similarly, the term regionalism refers to the proneness of the governments and peoples of two or more states to establish voluntary associations and to pool together resources (material and nonmaterial) in order to create common functional and institutional arrangements.
Furthermore, regionalism can be best described as a process occurring in a given geographical region by which different types of actors (states, regional institutions, societal organizations and other nonstate actors)
come to share certain fundamental values and norms. These actors also participate in a growing network of economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, political, and military interactions (Mace and Therien 1996, 2) Regionalization (the tendency or process to form regions) and regionalism (the purposive proneness to create regional institutions and arrangements) find expression in the economic and security domains, including convergent motivations toward both political/security and economic forms of integration. Some of the common factors that might explain the trend toward economic regionalism ('the new regionalism' of the 1980s and 1990s) are the effects of the end of the Cold War, the shifting balance of world economic power, the uneven effects of globalization, and the shift toward outward-oriented economic policies in many parts of the developing world (Fawcett 1995, 25) .
Nationalism and the Role of the Nation-State
Nationalism is an immediate derivative of the concept of nation. It refers to the feelings of attachment to one another that members of a nation have and to a sense of pride that a nation (or better, a nation-state) has in itself. Nationalism may be expressed in a number of ways, including the desire to obtain high standards of living, to win more gold medals than other nations at the Olympics, or to grab more territory from your neighbors. Since the eighteenth century, and especially in the twentieth century, nationalism has manifested itself often in the desire of the members of a nation to control and govern the territory in which they live. Hence, the concepts of nation and state fused to yield the 'nationstate,' while nationalism has been identified with the state itself. conclude that "the trend toward economic regionalism is perhaps more mixed than the trend toward security regionalism: In the international economy, globalization and regionalization appear to be pushing states in different directions, but there is today no major impetus toward globalization in the security arena," perhaps with the exception of nuclear issues such as nonproliferation (Lake 1997, 5, fn. 4) . Hence, the regionalization of security is not a universal trend like the formation of economic regions.
How Do Regionalization and Globalization Relate to Each Other?
There are three possible options regarding the mutual relations between regionalization and globalization, especially in the economic dimension:
(1) regionalization as a component of globalization (convergent trends); (2) regionalization as a challenge or response to globalization (divergent trends); (3) regionalization and globalization as parallel processes (overlapping trends) (see Mittelman 1996a).
A. Regionalization as a Component of Globalization:
Regionalism is emerging today as a potent force in the processes of globalization. If globalization is regarded as the compression of the temporal and spatial aspects of social relations, then regionalism may be understood as but one component, or 'chapter' of globalization (Mittelman 1996a, 189) . According to this view, by helping national economies to become more competitive in the world market, regional integration will lead to multilateral cooperation on a global scale, the adoption of liberal premises about cooperation, and the opening of the local economies.
Thus, the process of regional integration can be interpreted as part of the international (or global) economic order at the end of the twentieth century; if impelled by raw material forces (of the market), then it becomes a result and a component of globalization (see Reynolds 1997, 1) .
Moreover, since globalization unfolds in uneven rather than uniform dynamic patterns, it may reveal itself in processes that are less than geographically global in scope. Therefore, globalization may be expressed through regionalization (Holm and Sorensen 1995, 6-7) .
B. Regionalization as a Challenge or Response to Globalization:
Is regionalism a means toward something else other than globalization? Can regionalism lead to a more pluralistic world order populated by diverse and distinct patterns of socioeconomic organizations that are accountable to their populations? (See Mittelman 1996a, 189.) Unlike the first trend, the impetus toward regionalization might stem in this case from a reaction and challenge to the amorphous, undemocratic, and inexorable economic rules of globalization. This reaction can be motivated by either nationalistic/mercantilistic or pluralistic/humanistic concerns (in same cases, even by both). In the first place, by creating trade blocs and integration frameworks based on mercantilistic premises, regionalism opposes the neoliberal 'harmony of interest' view of the world economy in favor of national (and regional) loyalties and frameworks.
Conversely, the drive toward the formation of regions might be also motivated by the denial of a single universal culture (and ideology) and the promotion of alternative or pluralistic forms of social and political organizations other than the nation-states at the regional level.
C. Regionalization and Globalization as Parallel Processes:
When we refer to the world economy, it encompasses the trends of both regional-ization-i.e., the division of the international economy into the megaregions of North America (or the Americas), Europe, and East Asia-and globalization (see Wyatt-Walter 1995) . Conversely, in the international (global) security arena, it is more difficult to assess the (co)existence of security communities and security complexes without an overall dimension of global security, which is less evident. Thus, rather than reacting to each other, a third possibility is that regionalization and globalization might act as parallel or overlapping processes in the two issue-areas of economics and security.
How Do Globalization, Regionalization, and Nationalism Interact? 
A. Nation-States and Nationalism Oppose Processes of
Globalization:
Processes of disintegration, fragmentation, autarky, and localization diverge from the overall trend of globalization. For instance, the blossoming of statehood may be a response to the homogenizing forces of globalization (Holsti 1996a, 22) . The persistence or resurgence of nationalism can be regarded as a response to the alienating forces of the global market, by relocating or bolstering legitimacy and loyalties at the national or even subnational levels, in direct contradiction to the transnational or supranational logic of economic globalization.
B. Nationalism and the Formation of New States Are Encouraged by the Forces of Globalization:
Through a process of technological dissemination, globalization might actually promote nationalism and the formation of new states.
Hence, globalization and nationalism might converge, through a new (global) revolution of 'rising expectations,' which encourages states to cope with and to manage the forces of globalization. Here lies an interesting paradox: Although forces of globalization seem to undermine state sovereignty, technological changes might also improve the material conditions for the enhancement or resurgence of nationalistic trends.
Thus, globalization creates new strategies and roles for the nation-state (Drezner 1998, 210 and 218) .
C. Nation-States Oppose the Forces of Regionalization:
Nation-states might oppose forces of regionalization that attempt to transcend the power (and authority) of the state in a supranational direction by setting limits and constraints to the development of a regional identity and supranational institutions. Thus, states will regard regional and subregional integration frameworks through the prism of international organizations with a limited mandate in terms of intervention, domestic jurisdiction, and the exercise of sovereignty.
D. Nationalism and the Nation-States Can Be Strengthened through Regionalism:
As mentioned above, regionalization in a given region might result from mercantilistic/ nationalistic tendencies of the member-states that see frameworks of regional integration as a means to pool and increase their national power resources. In this sense, the logic of the 'new regionalism'
is not very different from that of the 'old' security alliances. In both cases, the goal is to guarantee the bloc (region) members greater security in their international relations in a context of increasing vulnerability of either the world economy or global security (see Axline 1996, 199 ).
E. Regionalization Coexists with Nationalism and with Globalization:
In this case we have neither convergence nor divergence but rather coexistence-the three processes are taking place simultaneously. Thus, there might be parallel processes of globalization and continuing trends of fragmentation and disintegration. Historically, political fragmentation, often manifested by the quest for national self-determination and the creation of new states, has been a trend with as much significance as the (parallel) forces of economic globalization (Holsti 1996a, 21-22) . In this perspective the effects of globalization upon regionalization and especially on the nation-state are rather indeterminate: "The structural logic of globalization and the recent history of the global economy can be read as providing rationales for 'high stateness' as well as 'low stateness'" (Evans 1997, 64) . Whether processes of globalization might undermine the role and actions of the nation-state remains to be seen and should be examined in particular regional contexts.
F. Nation-States Mediate between Trends of Regionalization and
Globalization:
States are active players in the world arena, and their policies are probably the single most important determinant of the scope and direction of both regionalization and globalization (see Holm and Sorensen 1995, 7) . The stronger the states, the more capable they are in coping with the intricacies of the economic, political, social, technological, and cultural dimensions of globalization. Conversely, the weaker they are, the more 'penetrated' or exposed to the vulnerabilities of the world economy and the temptations of a shallow world culture and ideology (see Evans 1997, 69-70) .
G. Nation-States Oppose Globalization through Processes of Regionalization:
Nationalism and globalization are linked dialectically. Three major global transformations are signaled as symptoms of the obsolescence of the state system: the nuclear revolution in contemporary warfare, the interdependence of national economies, and the advent of a global society dealing with global issues (Gilpin 1981, 214-25) . Yet, the significance of these transformations in terms of state resilience vis-à-vis the forces of globalization and regionalization is still open to debate.
In a futuristic best-seller, Paul Kennedy (1993, 129-31) the loyalty given to a single nation-state; and (5) the protection and enhancement of universal human rights vs. the norms of state sovereignty, including the principle of nonintervention (Brown 1992, 117) .
In this regard states are deemed obsolete since they cannot guarantee peace and security at the global level, they cannot fulfill the goals of economic and social justice on a global or even local basis, and they are unable to resolve global ecological crises that transcend political borders.
To sum up, four major arguments have been advanced to demonstrate the obsolescence of the state system in this age of globalization: (1) the global ecological crisis; (2) the development of global social movements and the emergence of a global civil society; (3) the deepening of global interdependence associated with economic globalization; and (4) transnational relations at the economic, social, cultural, and even political levels.
(1) The ecological crisis on a planetary scale poses a more profound threat to the continuing relevance of the state system than the nuclear revolution. The ecological challenge epitomizes the irrevocable gulf between the artificial reality of state sovereignty on the basis of enclosed territorial domains, and the global reality of ecological dynamics (such as environmental pollution or global warming), which do not recognize any political borders (Falk 1975, 23) . By definition, then, there is an inherent incompatibility and even contradiction between the national logic of sovereign states and the logic of global problems that cannot be resolved by states on an independent or autarkic basis.
(2) A second and concomitant argument emphasizes the emergence of globalization forces at the 'grassroots' level, or 'from below': the emergence of a global civil society through the transnational undertakings of social forces dedicated to the promotion of human rights, democracy, and sustainable development worldwide (Falk 1993, 221) (3) A third and related argument underscores the role of the economic dimensions of globalization, especially its financial aspects, in the deepening of global interdependence and the erosion of state sovereignty. The state is losing its function as a territorially bounded 'national economy' within the framework of a larger 'world economy.' This role of 'national economies' has been "undermined or even brought into question by the major trans-formations in the international division of labor, whose basic units are transnational or multinational enterprises of all sizes, and by the corresponding development of international centers and networks of economic transactions which are, for practical purposes, outside the control of state governments" (Hobsbawm 1990, 181) . Hence, states are increasingly losing their autonomy in managing their domestic and international economic policies as a result of the deepening of their economic interdependence and the unregulated forces of economic globalization.
(4) Finally, nonterritorial actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international and nongovernmental organizations link to subnational groups within states to form together a transnational network to establish a global society that transcends the scope of the state system. Thus, transnational relations contribute to the further 'sandwiching' of the state, by creating a 'control gap' between the state aspirations for control and its capability to reach it (Nye and Keohane 1971, xxiii) .
It is hard to argue about the facts involved in the four dimensions of globalization presented above. Yet, we come back to the question of interpreting them. Nobody will dispute that these four elements-the global ecological crisis, the emergence of a civil society on a global scale, economic interdependence and financial/economic globalization, and transnational relations-all pose a current challenge to the state system and obviously erode state sovereignty, changing the nature of the state and its functionality. But do erosion and challenge mean necessarily obsolescence? Do the forces of globalization and regionalization lead to the neutralization of nationalism and the irrelevance of the nation-state?
In the first place, states are the problem but they can also be part of the solution in our age of globalization, plagued by ecological and other pernicious global issues, provided states can learn (or can be compelled to learn) how to cooperate at the global level through international institutions, especially through international regimes and other multilateral frameworks. Thus, "Those who say that what we have to do is [to] get 'beyond the states-system' forget that war, economic injustice, and ecological mismanagement have deeper causes than those embodied in any particular form of universal political organization [such as the state system, AK] (Bull 1979, 114) .
Second, even if we recognize a reality of globalization 'from below' through the emergence of a global civil society, including nonstate actors and transnational relations, it does not necessarily follow that this global civil society is rendering the state system obsolete. As with the relationship between civil society and its state in the domestic sphere, the 'game' between the global civil society and the state system does not have to be a zero-sum one. It is plausible to argue, for instance, that the increase in the importance of transnational economic flows has been accompanied by a concomitant increase in the role of state machineries (Evans 1985) . Similarly, economic forces of globalization have challenged state sovereignty, but at the same time they have also invited responses from states to coordinate their policies and to cope with those challenges (for instance, through the role of international institutions such as the IMF).
Third, increased economic interdependence and the logic of world capitalism is not entirely inconsistent with the role of the state in international relations, even though the recent financial crises in East Asia seem to epitomize the evident incongruence between financial markets and the relative irrelevance of the state. For instance, high levels of exchange and market-rational outcomes in a situation of economic interdependence require stable property rights that minimize costs and increase benefits. So far, the only actors capable of providing such rights have been the modern nation-states (Thompson and Krasner 1989, 197) .
Finally, although transnational relations have been significant in world politics, it is not clear whether they have undermined the state system. To begin with, the importance of the multinational corporations does not imply necessarily that they are independent from the action and control of states. Moreover, in many cases states have learned how to manipulate transnational actors to enhance their own power and influence.
Ultimately, the real choice for states and governments is not how best to fight globalization but rather how to manage it. According to Haas and Litan (1998, 6 ), a paradox lies in the fact that although the age of globalization is usually characterized as challenging the state-system, it is still states and government who determine how to exploit or squander the potential of globalization. In sum, despite the assault on state sovereignty and states' vulnerabilities (and/or irrelevance) regarding financial markets, the nation-state still remains in (at least partial) control of fiscal and monetary policies, foreign economic policies, international business and, ultimately, war (Drucker 1997 ).
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS: PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITIES
The different linkages among the trends of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism can be illustrated in the cases of pluralistic security communities.
Defining Pluralistic Security Communities
The concept of pluralistic security communities is directly linked to the notion of integration. According to Haas (1970) , the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states voluntarily 2) Conversely, by being pluralistic, security communities do not rule out the national character, and political independence, of the member-states.
3) Security communities, by establishing regions of common identity, epitomize the trends toward regionalization and regionalism. In addition to the possible contradictions between regionalization and globalization, there is also a potential (if not real) divergence between nationalism and national identity and the establishment of a regional identity that somehow transcends the national identity, despite the 'pluralistic' character of the community. There is an inherent ambiguity on the part of the members of the community (states and peoples) towards delegating their loyalties and authority to supranational levels of identity and sovereignty.
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE
Some empirical evidence regarding the complex relationships among the three trends can be traced at the regional level by examining different patterns in different regions. For instance, in the Latin American case we can find examples of regionalization and integration, the insertion of the region within economic globalization, nationalism and the continuing role of the state, and the emergence of an incipient pluralistic security community in the Southern Cone of South America.
Regionalization and Integration in Latin America
Regionalism in the Americas has historically meant two quite different things. In the first place, it has meant regional cooperation and attempted economic integration among the countries of Latin America, excluding the United States. The second form of regionalism covers the entire Western Hemisphere, at the inter-American or Pan-American level, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego (Hurrell 1995b, 250 ). I will focus here upon the Latin American type of regionalism.
In the Latin American experience after World War II, as in other Recent state-led cooperation and the emergence of integrative frameworks were designed to promote economic interdependence, not only to manage it. For political rather than economic reasons, such as the need to legitimize and to enhance the new democratic regimes, states decide to create economic interdependence through the institutionalization of mutual cooperation. In contrast to the common theoretical assumption, the order of causality has been reversed in Latin America: economic interdependence became the consequence, not the cause, of political cooperation and of economic integration. Moreover, we have not seen in Latin America a unilinear progression or a 'spillover' process but rather a 'spillaround process' of overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements, where an impasse in one scheme of integration typically led to the creation of yet another scheme (Klaveren 1993, 118) . Hence, increased regional integration is gaining momentum as Latin American economies have emerged from the 'lost decade' of the 1980s, restructured along neoliberal lines and pursuing increasingly market-oriented paths to economic development (Harper and Cuzan 1997, 144 ).
Latin America and Globalization
As (Harper and Cuzan 1997, 133 and 143; Espindola 1998, 10) . Paradoxically, the more the region has been integrated into the post-Cold War era of economic globalization, characterized by free market homogeneity and cutthroat competition for financial markets, the more it fears being left out and 'marginalized' without any economic or political alternatives (Castañeda 1994 ).
Turning to the relationship between regionalization and globalization, we can trace in Latin America the three possible patterns discussed above:
A. Regionalization as a Component of Globalization
The 'new regionalism' in Latin America reconciles itself with the forces of economic globalization, being a component of it. In this sense, the schemes of regional integration in Latin America are part and parcel, and derived from, the economic forces of globalization.
B. Regionalization as a Challenge to Globalization
According 
C. Regionalization and Globalization as Parallel Processes
According to this view, we can witness in Latin America the unfolding of multiple and parallel processes of regionalization and globalization that do not necessarily converge or diverge but merely coexist: plans for a free trade area at the Hemispheric level overlap with subregional schemes of economic integration (e.g., Mercosur and the Andean Group).
The adoption of neoliberal policies, within a framework of regionalization and globalization, have not succeeded in bringing about greater economic benefits shared with greater equity by the whole population (Ward 1997, 107) . Hence, regionalization and globalization in the region have also brought disarray, which leads us to pose the question about the lingering role of the state vis-à-vis these two forces and their pernicious effects.
Nationalism and the Residual Role of the State in Latin America
In the early decades of the nineteenth century independent states had emerged in all the territory of mainland Central and South America.
As compared with other regions of the Third World, the Latin American Interestingly, these demands for self-determination imply local (usually cultural and economic) autonomy rather than secessionist claims to create new independent states.
In domestic terms the state has always been a primary factor in the process of economic and political development in the region (see Anderson 1967; Smith 1992) . Nowadays, the state in Latin America continues to fulfill a prime role in the national economy, though it has notoriously retreated from productive and distributive functions to that of facilitating surplus extraction and the insertion of the national economies within the whirlpool of economic globalization (see Hagopian 1994; Nef and Bensabat 1992) . Hence, it seems that even if the state in Latin
America is in the business of liquidating its traditional economic and social roles, it still fulfills a crucial economic and social function in doing so. In this sense an important distinction should be kept between state withdrawal from its role in economic and social life and its retreat from a basic mandate to provide essential public goods, such as personal security, functioning courts, and some semblance of formal legal equality (Adelman 1998, 12) .
For Latin America the triumph of capitalism and of economic globalization as a whole has reinforced the need for substantial reductions in the size and functions of the state (Fishlow 1994, 65 ). Yet, despite its residual role, the state in the region remains an essential force for coping with and responding to the trends toward regionalization and globalization, both in positive and negative terms.
Mercosur as an Incipient Pluralistic Security Community?
The highest level of peace and integration Latin America (or any other region) can expect to achieve is through the formation and maintenance of a pluralistic security community. Nowadays there is a debate-focusing upon the recent Mercosur institutional framework, grouping Argentina and Brazil together with the two small buffer states of Uruguay and Paraguay-as to whether the Southern Cone countries of South America have moved in the direction of a security community (see Castañeda 1994; Holsti 1996b; Hurrell 1994; Kacowicz 1994 and forthcoming; Hirst and Rico 1992) .
Has 
Recap: Complex Linkages in Latin America
A complex reality of integration and disintegration can be identified in the context of Latin America (Petrash 1998 ). This reality is characterized by multiple drives toward both regionalization and globalization and by regionalism at the inter-American (pan-American) and
Latin American levels. The result is a complex web of linkages, including the following:
A. Nation-States and Nationalism Oppose Processes of
Globalization:
This trend can be identified through the focus of nationalist and revisionist demands, both at the subnational level (e.g., the continuing insurgency in Chiapas, Mexico) or at the regional level (Mercosur or the Andean Group) as a response to globalization.
B. Nation-States Oppose the Forces of Regionalization:
Despite the drive toward regionalization in Latin America, there is a basic reluctance on the part of the states in the region to give up their authority and sovereignty in favor of supranational frameworks. Hence, international cooperation and international institutions are preferred over federal or quasi-federal schemes.
C. Nationalism and the Nation-States Can Be Strengthened through Regionalism:
The new assertiveness of regional powers such as Argentina and
Brazil is directly related to their common efforts at regional integration. In this sense Mercosur has been a result of mercantilistic/nationalistic tendencies to pool and increase the national resources of its memberstates.
D. Regionalization Coexists with Nationalism and with Globalization:
The 'new regionalism' in Latin America does not necessarily contradict the trend toward a global economy. Thus, paradoxically, the rationale that justifies the formation or revitalization of subregional schemes of economic integration can stem from either a nationalistic approach or from a neoliberal orthodoxy. While dependencistas and mercantilists will support the Andean Group or Mercosur as an example of subregional autarky and national (or regional) assertiveness, neoliberals will also encourage those integrative schemes as stepping stones in a process of economic globalization. Depending upon contradictory philosophical or ideological beliefs, regionalization trends in Latin America can be regarded as either convergent with globalization (neoliberals) or diverging and challenging it (dependencistas and nationalists).
E. Nation-States Mediate between Trends of Regionalization and
Globalization:
Notwithstanding any of those alternative interpretations, it is evident that the role of the nation-states in Latin America has remained crucial to managing regionalism and coping with the forces of globalization, by encouraging or opposing the permeability of their societies to the forces of globalization. For instance, states and governments have negotiated the increasing role of the IMF in the (re)shaping of their economies, in accord with the logic of economic globalization.
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS
The picture given in this paper has been one of indeterminacy and complexity, of uneven globalization and regional differentiation.
Globalization, nationalism, and regionalization are important trends that shape world politics, though their inherent importance is relative to one another through dynamic linkages of convergence, divergence, and uneasy coexistence or overlapping. As a consequence it is probably more accurate (though less parsimonious) to refer to different types and shapes of regionalization or regionalism, and even to several ways and dimensions of globalization, rather than a single, 'global' one. What are the implications of this analysis? In the first place, we have to be much more careful in the way we define concepts and use the rhetoric of globalization, shying away from the dogmatism we used in the past with reference to terms such as 'national interest' or 'complex interdependence.' We are witnessing a long and tedious process in which the state and the state system are being transformed by the forces of globalization and regionalization but not necessarily replaced by them.
Secondly, a more clear distinction should be drawn between the reality of the nation-state and that of state sovereignty. While there is no current alternative to the state system, it is becoming evident that state sovereignty has been eroded by the action of nonstate actors, the shaping of regional frameworks with supranational elements, and the dynamics of globalization.
Finally, there is a normative reason why we should care about the fate of the nation-state in relation to regionalization and globalization.
Although globalization has been ideologically linked to the spread of democratization, the forces of globalization (and to a lesser extent those of regionalization as well) have been anything but democratic, responding mainly to the amorphous and economic (Darwinist?) logic of the global market. Thus, to preserve democracy we need democratic regimes, not embedded in transnational economic boards or supranational and unelected bureaucracies but within nation-states and accountable to their respective populations.
